Abductive Inference Models for Diagnostic Problem-Solving (Symbolic Computation)

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ISBN 13: 9781461264507

Ajith A Harvinder S. Saini, Raj Kamal and A. Ind Res J Ext Edu 8.

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Agri SciJ 9 8 Lucus P. Symbolic diagnosis and its formalization, Knowle. Pinaki Chakraborti, Dr. Peng Y and. I perform an abduction when I so much as express in a sentence anything I see.

The truth is that the whole fabric of our knowledge is one matted felt of pure hypothesis confirmed and refined by induction. Not the smallest advance can be made in knowledge beyond the stage of vacant staring, without making an abduction at every step.

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It was Peirce's own maxim that "Facts cannot be explained by a hypothesis more extraordinary than these facts themselves; and of various hypotheses the least extraordinary must be adopted. Abductive validation is a method for identifying the assumptions that will lead to your goal. Subjective logic generalises probabilistic logic by including degrees of uncertainty in the input arguments, i. Abduction in subjective logic is thus a generalization of probabilistic abduction described above. The equality between the different expressions for subjective abduction is given below:. The advantage of using subjective logic abduction compared to probabilistic abduction is that uncertainty about the input argument probabilities can be explicitly expressed and taken into account during the analysis.

It is thus possible to perform abductive analysis in the presence of uncertain arguments, which naturally results in degrees of uncertainty in the output conclusions. Over the years he called such inference hypothesis , abduction , presumption , and retroduction. He considered it a topic in logic as a normative field in philosophy, not in purely formal or mathematical logic, and eventually as a topic also in economics of research.


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As two stages of the development, extension, etc. That is why, in the scientific method known from Galileo and Bacon , the abductive stage of hypothesis formation is conceptualized simply as induction. Thus, in the twentieth century this collapse was reinforced by Karl Popper 's explication of the hypothetico-deductive model , where the hypothesis is considered to be just "a guess" [13] in the spirit of Peirce. However, when the formation of a hypothesis is considered the result of a process it becomes clear that this "guess" has already been tried and made more robust in thought as a necessary stage of its acquiring the status of hypothesis.

Indeed, many abductions are rejected or heavily modified by subsequent abductions before they ever reach this stage. Before , Peirce treated abduction as the use of a known rule to explain an observation, e. Abduction can lead to false conclusions if other rules explaining the observation are not taken into account e.

This remains the common use of the term "abduction" in the social sciences and in artificial intelligence. Peirce consistently characterized it as the kind of inference that originates a hypothesis by concluding in an explanation, though an unassured one, for some very curious or surprising anomalous observation stated in a premise. As early as he wrote that all conceptions of cause and force are reached through hypothetical inference; in the s he wrote that all explanatory content of theories is reached through abduction.

In other respects Peirce revised his view of abduction over the years. Writing in , Peirce admits that "in almost everything I printed before the beginning of this century I more or less mixed up hypothesis and induction" and he traces the confusion of these two types of reasoning to logicians' too "narrow and formalistic a conception of inference, as necessarily having formulated judgments from its premises.

He started out in the s treating hypothetical inference in a number of ways which he eventually peeled away as inessential or, in some cases, mistaken:. Note that categorical syllogisms have elements traditionally called middles, predicates, and subjects. For example: All men [middle] are mortal [predicate]; Socrates [subject] is a man [middle]; ergo Socrates [subject] is mortal [predicate]". Below, 'M' stands for a middle; 'P' for a predicate; 'S' for a subject. Note also that Peirce held that all deduction can be put into the form of the categorical syllogism Barbara AAA In , in "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis", [27] there is no longer a need for multiple characters or predicates in order for an inference to be hypothetical, although it is still helpful.

Moreover, Peirce no longer poses hypothetical inference as concluding in a probable hypothesis. In the forms themselves, it is understood but not explicit that induction involves random selection and that hypothetical inference involves response to a "very curious circumstance". The forms instead emphasize the modes of inference as rearrangements of one another's propositions without the bracketed hints shown below. Rule: All the beans from this bag are white. Case: These beans are from this bag.

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Case: These beans are [randomly selected] from this bag. Result: These beans are white. Result: These beans [oddly] are white. Peirce long treated abduction in terms of induction from characters or traits weighed, not counted like objects , explicitly so in his influential "A Theory of Probable Inference", in which he returns to involving probability in the hypothetical conclusion. Today abduction remains most commonly understood as induction from characters and extension of a known rule to cover unexplained circumstances. Sherlock Holmes uses this method of reasoning in the stories of Arthur Conan Doyle , although Holmes refers to it as " deductive reasoning ".

In Peirce wrote that he now regarded the syllogistical forms and the doctrine of extension and comprehension i. The hypothesis is framed, but not asserted, in a premise, then asserted as rationally suspectable in the conclusion. Thus, as in the earlier categorical syllogistic form, the conclusion is formulated from some premise s. But all the same the hypothesis consists more clearly than ever in a new or outside idea beyond what is known or observed.

Induction in a sense goes beyond observations already reported in the premises, but it merely amplifies ideas already known to represent occurrences, or tests an idea supplied by hypothesis; either way it requires previous abductions in order to get such ideas in the first place. Induction seeks facts to test a hypothesis; abduction seeks a hypothesis to account for facts.

Note that the hypothesis "A" could be of a rule.

It need not even be a rule strictly necessitating the surprising observation "C" , which needs to follow only as a "matter of course"; or the "course" itself could amount to some known rule, merely alluded to, and also not necessarily a rule of strict necessity. In the same year, Peirce wrote that reaching a hypothesis may involve placing a surprising observation under either a newly hypothesized rule or a hypothesized combination of a known rule with a peculiar state of facts, so that the phenomenon would be not surprising but instead either necessarily implied or at least likely.

Peirce did not remain quite convinced about any such form as the categorical syllogistic form or the form. In , he wrote, "I do not, at present, feel quite convinced that any logical form can be assigned that will cover all 'Retroductions'. For what I mean by a Retroduction is simply a conjecture which arises in the mind.

In Peirce wrote, "There would be no logic in imposing rules, and saying that they ought to be followed, until it is made out that the purpose of hypothesis requires them. Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. It is a method for fruitful clarification of conceptions by equating the meaning of a conception with the conceivable practical implications of its object's conceived effects.

Peirce held that that is precisely tailored to abduction's purpose in inquiry, the forming of an idea that could conceivably shape informed conduct. In various writings in the s [24] [39] he said that the conduct of abduction or retroduction is governed by considerations of economy, belonging in particular to the economics of research.

He regarded economics as a normative science whose analytic portion might be part of logical methodeutic that is, theory of inquiry. Peirce came over the years to divide philosophical logic into three departments:. Peirce had, from the start, seen the modes of inference as being coordinated together in scientific inquiry and, by the s, held that hypothetical inference in particular is inadequately treated at the level of critique of arguments.

That is Peirce's outline of the scientific method of inquiry, as covered in his inquiry methodology, which includes pragmatism or, as he later called it, pragmaticism , the clarification of ideas in terms of their conceivable implications regarding informed practice. As early as , [41] Peirce held that:. Hypothesis abductive inference is inference through an icon also called a likeness. Induction is inference through an index a sign by factual connection ; a sample is an index of the totality from which it is drawn.

Deduction is inference through a symbol a sign by interpretive habit irrespective of resemblance or connection to its object. In , Peirce wrote that, in abduction: "It is recognized that the phenomena are like , i. At the critical level Peirce examined the forms of abductive arguments as discussed above , and came to hold that the hypothesis should economize explanation for plausibility in terms of the feasible and natural.

In Peirce described this plausibility in some detail. Even a well-prepared mind guesses oftener wrong than right, but our guesses succeed better than random luck at reaching the truth or at least advancing the inquiry, and that indicates to Peirce that they are based in instinctive attunement to nature, an affinity between the mind's processes and the processes of the real, which would account for why appealingly "natural" guesses are the ones that oftenest or least seldom succeed; to which Peirce added the argument that such guesses are to be preferred since, without "a natural bent like nature's", people would have no hope of understanding nature.

In Peirce made a three-way distinction between probability, verisimilitude, and plausibility, and defined plausibility with a normative "ought": "By plausibility, I mean the degree to which a theory ought to recommend itself to our belief independently of any kind of evidence other than our instinct urging us to regard it favorably. The phrase "inference to the best explanation" not used by Peirce but often applied to hypothetical inference is not always understood as referring to the most simple and natural hypotheses such as those with the fewest assumptions. However, in other senses of "best", such as "standing up best to tests", it is hard to know which is the best explanation to form, since one has not tested it yet.

Still, for Peirce, any justification of an abductive inference as good is not completed upon its formation as an argument unlike with induction and deduction and instead depends also on its methodological role and promise such as its testability in advancing inquiry. At the methodeutical level Peirce held that a hypothesis is judged and selected [22] for testing because it offers, via its trial, to expedite and economize the inquiry process itself toward new truths, first of all by being testable and also by further economies, [24] in terms of cost, value, and relationships among guesses hypotheses.

Here, considerations such as probability, absent from the treatment of abduction at the critical level, come into play. For examples:. Applications in artificial intelligence include fault diagnosis , belief revision , and automated planning. The most direct application of abduction is that of automatically detecting faults in systems: given a theory relating faults with their effects and a set of observed effects, abduction can be used to derive sets of faults that are likely to be the cause of the problem.

In medicine , abduction can be seen as a component of clinical evaluation and judgment. Abduction can also be used to model automated planning.


In intelligence analysis , analysis of competing hypotheses and Bayesian networks , probabilistic abductive reasoning is used extensively. Similarly in medical diagnosis and legal reasoning, the same methods are being used, although there have been many examples of errors, especially caused by the base rate fallacy and the prosecutor's fallacy. The purpose of the Catalogue of Artificial Intelligence Techniques is to promote interaction between members of the AI community.

It does this by announcing the existence of AI techniques, and acting as a pointer into the literature.